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2 sheds light on the nature of the wrong of colonialism. My argument proceeds as follows. In Section I, I present Ypi's account of the distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism, and note that it is susceptible to two interpretations: an "aggregate" and a "corporate" one. In Sections II and III, I explain why neither interpretation is convincing. The aggregate interpretation over-reaches: it leads us to condemn as wrongful a range of practices that are instead justified. The corporate interpretation problematically presupposes that collective entities are fundamental units of moral concern, contrary to normative individualism. The difficulties with Ypi's view prompt me to suggest, in Section IV, that either there is no distinctive procedural wrong attached to the unilateral takeover of political collectives or, if there is, this wrong was unlikely to be instantiated in many real-world cases of colonization. I thus conclude that, although colonialism was wrong for countless reasons, there is no distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism.
I. Ypi's account of the wrong of colonialism
What is colonialism? Ypi understands it as a "practice that involves collective political agents," whereby some such agents (the colonizers) subjugate others (the colonized) and exercise "political and economic control" over them.
3 For Ypi, colonialism so understood is always wrong-indeed, she asks her readers to grant as much. 4 However, her diagnosis of the wrong of colonialism seeks to eschew appeal to violations of territorial rights, violations of national or cultural self-determination, and the brutality and violence that often go hand-in-hand with colonization. 5 To be sure, 3 Ibid., p. 162, added emphasis. Ypi notes that while political collectives are typically territorially organized, this territorial dimension is not relevant to the analysis of the wrong of colonialism. 4 Ibid., p. 158.
she readily concedes that forcibly relocating people, " [b] urning native settlements, torturing innocents, slaughtering children, enslaving entire populations, [and] exploiting the soil and natural resources available to them" are morally deplorable practices contingently associated with colonialism. 6 In other words, she acknowledges that colonial government involved the perpetration of serious substantive injustice.
But for Ypi, there is something wrong with colonialism as such, over and above its likely dire consequences for colonized populations.
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As she puts it, " [c] olonialism is a distinctive wrong." 8 Yet it is "a distinctive wrong within a larger family of wrongs, the wrong exhibited by associations that deny their members equality and reciprocity in decision making." 9 In the colonial case specifically, this denial of equality and reciprocity is crystallized in the unilateral subjection of the colonized collective to the will of the colonizing one. In Ypi's view, it is the procedural unilateralism of colonialism that explains its inherently wrongful nature. And since this unilateralism is constitutive of colonialism, for Ypi, colonialism is non-contingently procedurally wrong, and distinctively so.
The procedural unilateralism of colonialism, Ypi further argues, may be instantiated in two loci: in the formation of a new, colonial political association, and in the internal structure of that association. 10 Each such instantiation of unilateralism, she suggests, is sufficient to make a political relation procedurally wrongful in the way colonialism is. To see Ypi's point, consider the following two scenarios, which illustrate, respectively, the wrong of colonial acquisition of political control and the 6 Ibid., p. 162. Why? Because it involves the subjection of the will of some to that of others. By hypothesis, the takeover is not negotiated with the Canadian people or their representatives, and does not enjoy their consent. It thus exhibits the distinctive procedural wrong of "colonial acquisition" of political control.
Second, consider a slave who has voluntarily consented to being under the power of his master, and who is made no worse off by virtue of having done so (i.e., the master is fully benevolent and protective of the slave). In this case, the formation of the master-slave relationship involves no procedural unilateralism, and its consequences are not detrimental to the slave. Yet many will still find the structure of this master-slave relationship objectionable. The slave is subject to the will of the master, who has control over him; he is not an equal decision-maker; decisions lie, ultimately, with the master. The wrong inherent in the structure of colonial relationships is, for Ypi, a version of the structural wrong of slavery, albeit one that distinctively involves political collectives as opposed to individuals. Those who find the master-slave relationship I have described objectionable will thus feel the force of Ypi's account.
Ypi's account is parsimonious and benefits from much intuitive appeal. In fact, it may seem so obviously correct that an uncharitably disposed reader might even find it trivial. "Of course," that reader might say, "the wrong of subjecting a political collective lies in the inequalities of power and status involved in that subjection." But the appearance that this is obviously correct is misleading. Much of it rests on an ambiguity in the notion of "political collective" that Ypi appeals to.
Specifically, the notion of a collective may be spelt out in either aggregate or corporate terms. 12 In the former case, a collective is just a set of individuals. In the latter case, a collective is an agent in its own right.
For instance, consider a paradigmatic political collective, such as a state-call it "state X." From an aggregate perspective, the expression "state X" is shorthand for "the group of individuals who are members of X." 13 By contrast, from a corporate perspective, "state X" is an agent in its own right-a collective agent-with its own beliefs, desires, and will. 14 This is the perspective we implicitly adopt when we claim that states "sign treaties," "declare wars," "send foreign aid," and so forth.
Depending on what is meant by a "political collective," the (alleged) 12 For a discussion of this distinction, see, e.g., Christian List, "Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes," Suppose we know that wrongful attacker A would consent only to terms of association that gave him full license to do whatever he wishes-drive at whichever speed he wants, appropriate whatever resources he wants, injure whomever he wants, and so forth. Unfortunately for A-and fortunately for everyone else-the terms of association of his polity are fair and give him no such license. Every time A breaches the speed limit, steals others' property or tries to attack innocent individuals, police intervenes to enforce laws to which A has not consented. Here too, it would seem 17 I am grateful to an anonymous reader for raising this objection.
incorrect to criticize the police's intervention as wrongful because A has not consented to the terms of association imposed on him. voluntarily take up a new citizenship.
Ypi is not unaware of these difficulties. Her response to them attempts to establish morally significant differences between the forms of control exercised by "regular" domestic governments and those practiced by colonial ones. The relevant passage is worth quoting at length.
In the colonial case, colonizers impose their will over the colonized, and the rules of association endorsed by the latter reflect the power of the former. In most cases of domestic subjection to political authority, we think of all citizens as equal in their subjection to the The passage offers a number of criteria-distinct from voluntary consentdetermining when control does not exhibit the procedural wrong of colonialism.
(Consent is mentioned again only in the final sentence.) These are:
1. The members' equal subjection to the law, and equal capacity to change it. 20 Ypi, "What's Wrong with Colonialism," p. 180, emphases added. See also Ypi's reference to democracy and representation (p. 176).
2. The laws' lack of negative impact on "the lives of subsequent generations of historically wronged groups."
3. The laws' "tracking the will" of historically wronged groups.
Given Ypi's appeal to so many different considerations-and her lack of explicit discussion of how they relate to each other-it is difficult to pinpoint precisely what, in her view, explains the distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism. As it turns out, however, we need not choose between criteria (1), (2) Regarding (1), the condition of equal subjection to the law is consistent with the content of the law being highly discriminatory in ways that violate Ypi's ideal of equality and reciprocity in decision-making. 21 Think of a society in which women lack the right to vote. There, every citizen is equally subjected to the law, yet the law treats male and female citizens very differently. Analogously, think of a law that explicitly gives colonizers the right to exploit the colonized. Here, colonizers and colonized are subjected to the same law, they are just treated very differently by it.
Appeal to the condition of equal subjection, therefore, problematically under-ascribes colonial wrongdoing.
Reliance on "equal capacity to change the law," by contrast, leads to an overascription of colonial wrongdoing, since there seems to be no real-world political community-even among well-functioning democratic ones-in which citizens have this capacity to an equal degree. For example, the U.S. President's capacity to change the law is much greater than that of any ordinary U.S. citizen. 22 If an equal capacity to change the law is needed for a political relationship to be not procedurally wrongful in the way colonialism is, then all existing, well-ordered democratic states count as wrongfully colonial-which again appears implausible.
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Ypi's first criterion might be interpreted differently, however. Perhaps, what
she is alluding to is citizens' formal equality under the law-including their equal formal right to participate in political decision-making. The trouble with this interpretation is that the lack of formal equality under the law is ill-suited to explain the distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism. Recall the earlier example involving a hypothetical Swedish takeover of Canada: this resulted precisely in a political union guaranteeing formal equality under the law to all its members (in fact, more than that). Yet, on Ypi's own account, it represented an instantiation of the distinctive 22 Lea Ypi has pointed out to me that every citizen (typically with some further qualification) can compete for presidential election. This response only pushes the "differential capacity" concern one step back. From a substantive point of view, not everyone has the same capacity to compete for presidential election (e.g., think of people who lack charisma, or opportunities for education wills" as her criterion for the acquisition of political control to count as non-unilateral, and point to voluntary consent as the most effective form of "will-tracking."
What is more, there is no government, at least in our pluralistic world, whose laws and policies always track the will of every single member. It is sufficient to consider existing well-constituted democracies, where majorities routinely outvote minorities. If tracking individuals' wills is necessary for avoiding "colonial wrongdoing," then all existing well-ordered democratic states exhibit the distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism, because their decisions do not enjoy the people's unanimous support-a conclusion that again implausibly over-reaches.
To be sure, people's disagreement about laws and policies may be regrettable;
and the world would perhaps be a happier place in the absence of such disagreement.
Furthermore-where feasible-it may be good, perhaps even obligatory, to draw political boundaries such that the terms of each political association are as consonant as possible with members' preferences. 27 Consider the referendum on Scottish independence, which took place in September 2014. It could be said that, had the U.K. government not allowed the Scottish to decide whether to become an independent political community-in light of their shared culture and political preferences-a particular kind of wrong would have occurred; perhaps, even a distinctively "colonial" wrong.
This may well be true, but it is not what I dispute. What I take issue with is the idea that tracking the will of every single subject is necessary for a government to avoid "colonial" wrongdoing. This condition fails to be met in the U.K. today, despite the referendum. And it would have failed to be met even if the referendum had resulted in Scottish independence-contrary to what actually happened. The laws of an independent Scotland would predictably not have tracked the will of all Scottish people; equally, the laws of the "rest of the U.K." would not have tracked the will of all remaining subjects. The suggestion that, for this reason, Scotland, the "rest of the U.K.," and any democratic society-even the best run one-would exhibit the procedural wrong typical of colonial domination is hard to take seriously. their polity is just), do not. Yet this does not appear sufficient to render that exercise of control wrongful in general-recall the "police" example-let alone procedurally wrongful in the way colonialism is.
On inspection, though, this is probably not a conclusion Ypi is committed to.
Towards the end of the above-quoted passage, she explicitly refers to the "will of a group," as opposed to that of individual members. If tracking the "will of the subjected group"-voluntary consent being the best, but not the only, way to do sois what makes political control non-unilateral, we need to turn to the corporate interpretation of Ypi's account.
III. The corporate interpretation
On this interpretation, a group is to be understood as a collective agent, with beliefs, desires, and a will of its own. What explains the distinctive wrong of colonialism is a failure, on the part of colonisers, to track the collective's will-e.g., by not acquiring Since she does not set out explicit criteria that political collectives must meet in order to acquire moral standing, the most straightforward corporate interpretation of her account relies on the following principle:
It is wrong to acquire/exercise control over a political collective without tracking its will (e.g., without its voluntary consent).
This principle is inconsistent with individual human beings' status as equal and ultimate units of moral concern. From a normative individualist perspective, the moral standing of a collective is explained by, and therefore conditional on, the collective's serving the legitimate interests of individuals. In turn, individual interests are legitimate only if they are consistent with reasonable demands of justice-namely with the principles that determine the distribution of "the benefits and burdens of social cooperation," and establish the rights and duties of fellow members of society. 31 To illustrate, I might have a subjective interest in stealing others' justly acquired possessions, and in preventing them from supporting political parties other than my preferred one, yet this interest is illegitimate, since it is at odds with others' rights to property and political participation.
Once the moral standing of collectives is explained in normative individualist terms, the above-stated principle turns out to be implausible. For example, it commits us to the view that the exercise of control over a tyrannical-and therefore paradigmatically unjust-state requires that state's voluntary consent in order not to be procedurally wrongful. But this cannot possibly be consistent with normative individualism. We can easily imagine a tyrannical state strongly opposing the unilateral acquisition of control by another state, yet its subjects favoring it, since it would be likely to improve their living conditions. 32 In such a case, from a normative 31 This is famously Rawls's characterization of the function of principles of justice. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 4. 32 One could object that a "tyrannical state" does not count as a political collective. This would be equal to adopting a normativized conception of collective agency, for which there is little theoretical warrant. For example, the dictatorial state of North Korea can be plausibly described as a collective agent, despite its morally repugnant policies. In other words, we should retain a distinction between individualist perspective, there would appear to be nothing procedurally wrong with the takeover-certainly not because of its being contrary to the will of the tyrannical state, or because of its undermining of a political association that its corrupt officials endorse. 33 Those officials clearly do not have a legitimate interest in the continued existence of the state. Explaining the procedural wrongness of taking over a tyrannical collective thus requires attributing standing to the collective independently of how this serves the legitimate interests of individuals, contrary to normative individualism.
In response, it might be suggested that a collective political agent has moral standing only as long as it upholds equality and reciprocity among its members: the political ideal central to Ypi's discussion. On this account, the procedural wrong of colonialism is explained by the following principle:
It is wrong to acquire/exercise control over a political collective without tracking its will (e.g., without its voluntary consent), if and only if the collective in question is "equal and reciprocal."
But in virtue of what does a collective count as "equal and reciprocal"? One possibility, consistent with our discussion in the previous section, is to invoke the consent-or the tracking of the will-of all members. This option predictably runs into difficulties. Since no realistic political collective tracks every member's will, it implies that no political collective has moral standing, and therefore no unilateral acquisition/exercise of control over any such collective-say, of Sweden over Canada "collective agents" simpliciter and "morally good collective agents." Cf. Applbaum's definition of a "normative people," in Applbaum, "Forcing a People to Be Free," pp. 380, 389.
33 If the takeover involved violence and rights violations we would, of course, have other reasons for condemning it.
in the earlier example-is procedurally wrong. This conclusion arguably underascribes wrongdoing, and at any rate is starkly at odds with Ypi's claim that colonialism is always (i.e., non-contingently) procedurally wrong.
Alternatively, we might think that the condition of "equality and reciprocity" is satisfied whenever a collective is appropriately attentive to the legitimate interests-not just the wills-of its members (and outsiders). 34 On this view, a political collective has moral standing as long as it is "reasonably just" towards individuals, procedurally as well as substantively. In line with her claim that colonialism is always distinctively procedurally wrong, Ypi rejects this conclusion-and the corporate interpretation of her account leading to it-insisting that the unilateral takeover of a deeply unjust political collective on the part of a reasonably just one is also procedurally wrong (at least pro tanto). To reach this verdict, however, she switches back to an aggregate interpretation of the notion of a collective. In her words, "[i]f members of a group are denied representation within the [original, unjust] group, it is not clear that they should be unilaterally forced into another [more just] association, one whose terms are also initially imposed on them." 37 This brings us back to the difficulties considered in the previous section, which I do not restate here.
IV. Concluding remarks
Ypi's claim that colonialism always instantiates a distinctive procedural wrong is intuitively appealing, but the foregoing discussion has put its tenability into question.
In fact, the difficulties with Ypi's view are serious enough to cast doubt on the very existence of a distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism. Recall that, for normative individualists, the moral standing of collective agents is explained by, and conditional on, the impact that these agents have on the legitimate interests of individuals. Furthermore, since individuals' interests are legitimate only if they are consistent with reasonable justice, from a normative individualist standpoint, a "justice-enhancing takeover" cannot be wrongful. That said, normative individualists may differ on whether a "justice-neutral" takeoveri.e., one where the resulting political community is as reasonably just as in the status quo ante-can be wrongful.
For some, namely those who see the moral standing of collectives as solely dependent on their conduciveness to reasonably just relations among individuals, it cannot. On this view, there are no resources to affirm the wrong involved in a peaceful and justice-neutral takeover of, say, Canada by Sweden. For how could the lack of consent on the part of the collective Canada be wrongful if (i) the standing of the collective Canada is reducible to its conduciveness to reasonably just relations among members and (ii) the Swedish government, by hypothesis, also establishes reasonably just relations among its newly acquired subjects?
To be sure, we may still intuitively feel that such a takeover would be wrongful. But this feeling can be easily explained. Since real-world takeovers are likely to be predatorial and violent, adopting a blanket "no takeover" norm is the better policy overall. 38 And since our intuition is trained to respond to real-world cases, it delivers a false positive in unrealistic scenarios such as the one depicting a peaceful Swedish takeover of Canada.
Once this becomes apparent, we are left with no reason to think that the takeover of a collective without its consent is ever wrong per se. What matters morally is the subjugation of individual human beings, their being denied equal status under the law, independently of the identity of the collective who makes and enforces the law. We should then conclude that what is wrong with colonialism, from a procedural perspective, is the same as what is wrong with regular domestic governments that fail to realize "relational" or "democratic" equality among their members. 39 Colonialism is thus procedurally wrong, but not distinctively so.
Though coherent, this first option will leave some readers dissatisfied. They will still feel uneasy about the moral pedigree of a hypothetical Swedish takeover of Canada-and this not merely because, were it to occur in the real world, it would be accompanied by much suffering and rights violations. The wrongness of the envisaged takeover seems to persist even if we take its philosophically "sanitized" description at face value.
This leads me to the second line of argument, which holds that collective agents may serve individuals' legitimate interests in ways that go beyond the establishment of reasonably just relations among them. How exactly collectives might do this depends on our specific conception of individuals' legitimate interests.
Multiple possibilities are available. Here I sketch the two I find most promising. A different view could instead appeal to individuals' interest in not being de facto disrespected. An action counts as "de facto disrespectful" when it falls under the purview of the notion of disrespect, as this is understood in the context in which the action is performed. Typically, actions that breach the positive norms characterizing a given context-i.e., actions that breach the permissions and prohibitions collectively accepted in that context 42 -are de facto disrespectful in that context. For example, in Japan, there is a positive norm according to which "one ought not to tip, especially by 40 Stilz, "The Value of Self-Determination."
41 Stilz doesn't use the language of "legitimate interests," but she is explicit that, if affirmation of one's membership in a political community is at odds with the satisfaction of (minimal) demands of justice, the latter should take priority. What Stilz calls "minimal justice" includes the protection of rights to subsistence, security, freedom of conscience, speech, association, and political opinion, but not of a right to full democratic participation. 45 This, I should emphasize, is neither to depict colonized communities as "uncivilized," nor to imply that their subjugators were somehow "morally superior."
The point I am making is modest, and hopefully uncontroversial: namely that, in all likelihood, many colonized communities were not reasonably just (at least not according to a normative individualist outlook on justice)-a claim that is equally true for their colonizers.
In light of this, while offering a promising starting point for developing an account of the procedural wrong of "unilateral control over political collectives" in general, this second line of argument-in both the "maker-freedom" and "respect"
versions-does not give us a characterization of the procedural wrong distinctive of colonialism in particular. Despite being deeply wrong for countless reasonsincluding racism, violence, exploitation, murder, forced relocation, violations of relational equality between individuals and so forth-many real-world instances of colonization probably did not display the distinctive wrong in question.
In conclusion, then, I remain sympathetic to the suggestion that the unilateral 44 Stilz, in particular, regards the affirmation of one's political membership as "authentic" only on condition that this occurs against a minimally just background. See Stilz, "Decolonization and SelfDetermination," pp. 17, 22-23 (page proofs).
45 This is likely to be the case, to a significant extent, even when the "reasonable justice" condition is interpreted in Stilz's somewhat minimalist terms (see note 41).
